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Child Protection Law and Procedure
Suellyn Scarnecchia
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IV. Termination of Parental Rights
A. Introduction §20.22
B. At the Initial Dispositional Hearing §20.23
C. After the Child Resides in Foster Care
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2. Desertion §20.25
3. Physical Injury or Sexual Abuse §20.26
4. No Progress by Parents §20.27
5. Failure of a Guardianship §20.28
6. No Proper Care or Custody §20.29
7. Parent Imprisoned §20.30
8. Rights to Sibling Previously Terminated §20.31
D. On the Basis of Changed Circumstances §20.32

V. Rehearings and Appeals
A. Rehearings §20.33
B. Appeals
1. In General §20.34
2. Appeals as of Right to the Court of Appeals §20.35
3. Appeals to the Circuit Court §20.36
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D. Reviews of Referee Decisions §20.38
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Forms
20.1
20.2
20.3
20.4
20.5
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20.7
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Motion and Order to Close Proceedings to Public (JC 41)
Complaint (Request for Action) (JC 01, JC 02)
Petition (JC 04)
Appearance of Attorney/Guardian Ad Litem (JC 07)
Summons: Order to Appear (Child Protective Proceeding) (JC 21)
Proof of Service/Nonservice (JC 12A)
Ad vice of Rights After Order Terminating Parental Rights
(Juvenile Code)/Request for Appeal (JC 44)
Request and Order for Review of Referee Recommendation (JC 42)

I. Overview
A.

Constitutional Protections
§20.1
It is public policy to keep children with their natural parents
whenever possible. The Michigan juvenile code, MCLA 712A.1 et seq.,
MSA 27 .3178(598.1) et seq., reflects such a policy: "This chapter shall be
liberally construed to the end that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive such care, guidance and control, preferably
in his or her own home, as will be conducive to the child's welfare and the
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best interest of the state . . . . " See also MCLA 722.628(2), MSA
25.248(8)[2]; MCR 5.902(B); In re Mathers, 371 Mich 516, 124 NW2d
878 (1963).
In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated, "The interest of
parent and child in their mutual support and society are of basic importance in our society and their relationship occupies a basic position in this
society's hierarchy of values. Clearly any legal adjustment of their mutual
rights and obligations affects a fundamental human relationship. The
rights at stake are 'protected' and encompassed within the meaning of the
term 'liberty' as us~d in the Due Process Clause." Reist v Bay Cty Circuit
Judge, 396 Mich 326, 341-342, 241 NW2d 55 (1976). In Santosky v
Kramer, 455 US 745, 753 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "The
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to
the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a
vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family
life."
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect a parent's custodial rights. However, such rights are not absolute and
may be terminated. There is no substantive due-process right to live
together as a family. Doe v Oettle, 97 Mich App 183, 293 NW2d 760
(1980). Parents are not held to ideal standards in the care of their children
but to minimum statutory standards. Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 92
NW2d 604 (1958).
Relevant Statutes and Court Rules
§20.2
Two statutes set forth Michigan's child abuse and neglect
law. The Child Protection Law, MCLA 722.621 et seq., MSA 25.248(1) et
seq., describes requirements for reporting and investigating suspected
child abuse and neglect. The Michigan juvenile code, MCLA 712A.1 et
seq., MSA 27.3178(598.1) et seq., encompasses juvenile court policy,
jurisdiction, and procedure. The code defines circumstances for taking
both temporary and permanent jurisdiction over a child. The code deals
with both minors against whom an act has been committed (child protection) and minors who have committed an act (delinquency). It is important
to determine whether a specific section of the code is referring to child
protection, to juvenile delinquency, or to both. Delinquency cases are
brought under MCLA 712A.2(a), MSA 27 .3178(598.2)[a]. Child protection cases are brought under MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b].
The code differentiates between the two types of cases, throughout, as
those falling under §2(a) or §2(b).
B.
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In addition, the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 et seq., sets
out the standards and procedure for taking jurisdiction over a child with
American Indian heritage. The guardianship section of the Revised Probate Code, specifically MCLA 700.424-.437, MSA 27.5424-.5437, provides for the appointment of a guardian for a minor. In 1990, the juvenile
code was amended to provide juvenile court jurisdiction in cases involving certain contested guardianships. The Michigan Adoption Code, MCLA
710.21 et seq., MSA 27.3178(555.21) et seq., provides for termination of
parental rights under certain circumstances. Finally, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 USC 675(5)(B), requires states,
including Michigan, to develop methods for ensuring permanent homes
for children through return to their parents or through adoption to receive
federal foster care funds.
Practice and procedure in the juvenile division of the probate court
are governed by subchapters 1.100 and 5.900 of the Michigan Court
Rules. Other Michigan Court Rules apply only if subchapter 5.900 specifies it. MCR 5.901(A); see also MCR 1.103. MCR 5.901-.927, .980, and
.991-.993 apply to delinquency and child protective proceedings; MCR
5.961-.974 apply only to child protective proceedings. MCR 5.901(B).
C.

Jurisdiction and Venue
§20.3
The juvenile division of the probate court (referred to in this
chapter as the juvenile court) has jurisdiction over cases of alleged child
abuse and neglect and termination of parental rights. The juvenile court has
no inherent powers: its authority to exercise jurisdiction over children and
to govern their lives is derived from the Michigan Constitution and statutes. Const 1963, art 6, §15; MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b];
see also Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 92 NW2d 604 (1958). MCLA
712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b] grants the juvenile court jurisdiction
over any child under 18 years of age found within the county
(1) [w]hose parent or other person legally responsible for the care
and maintenance of the child, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or
other care necessary for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a
substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian, or who is
without proper custody or guardianship ... [or]
(2) [ w ]hose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian,
or other custodian, is an unfit place for the child to live in.

Three more bases for taking jurisdiction were added in 1990. Subsections
(3) and (4) permit the taking of jurisdiction over a child with a guardian
20-4
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whose parent has failed to comply with a limited guardianship plan or a
court-structured guardianship plan respectively, as described in MCLA
700.424a, .424b, and .424c, MSA 27 .5424(1), (2), and (3). Subsection (5)
gives the juvenile court jurisdiction over a child with a guardian whose
parent has failed to both support and communicate with the child. The
juvenile code's new provision for jurisdiction over cases involving
guardianships corresponds to amendments of the guardianship provisions
of the Probate Code providing for referral of guardianships to the juvenile
court when a parent fails to comply with the guardianship plan. MCLA
700.424c(4)(c), MSA 27.5424(3)[4][c].
Terms in MCLA 712A.2(b)(l), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b][1] are defined as follows:
(A) "Education" means learning based on an organized educational program that is appropriate, given the age, intelligence, ability,
and any psychological limitations of a child, in the subject areas of
reading, spelling, mathematics, science, history, civics, writing, and
English grammar.
(B) "Without proper custody or guardianship" does not include
the situation where a parent has placed the child with another person
who is legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the child
and who is able to and does provide the child with proper care and
maintenance.

The second definition codifies earlier holdings that parents are free to
place their children in the care of a relative or other person of their
choosing as long as the relative's home is fit. See also In re Taurus F, 415
Mich 512, 330 NW2d 33 (1982); In re Ward, 104 Mich App 354, 304
NW2d 844 (1981). Placement, in and of itself, does not evidence a failure
to provide proper and necessary support for the child. In re Nelson, 190
Mich App 237, 475 NW2d 448 (1991). But see In re Systma, 197 Mich
App 453, 495 NW2d 804 (1992) (temporary placement with mother's
relatives just before her death did not preclude assumption of jurisdiction
when challenged by imprisoned father.)
Under some circumstances, the juvenile court's jurisdiction may continue beyond a child's eighteenth birthday, until age 20. MCLA
712A.2a(l), MSA 27.3178(598.2a)[1]; see also MCLA 712A.11, MSA
27.3178(598.11).
A juvenile court should not assume jurisdiction until sufficient allegations are made in a petition. In re Youmans, 156 Mich App 679, 401
NW2d 905 (1986); In re Adrianson, 105 Mich App 300, 306 NW2d 487
(1981). Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. Where
a father stipulated to jurisdiction, there was no reversible error because
the court had found sufficient evidence to support the taking of jurisdic20-5
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tion. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 484 NW2d 672 (1992). Both parents
need not be culpable for the court to assume temporary jurisdiction over a
child. MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b] gives the court jurisdiction over a child whose home environment, because of "a parent," is an
unfit place for the child to live. However, it is important to identify both
parents on the initial petition and to explicitly state why neither parent can
properly provide for the children. Failure to identify the father early in a
case might deprive the child of a placement with his or her father or might
complicate attempts to terminate parental rights later in the case.
A circuit court that has jurisdiction over a minor pursuant to divorce
proceedings may waive jurisdiction of the minor to the juvenile division
of the juvenile court on a prima facie showing of neglect. MCLA
552.16(7), 712A.2(c), MSA 25.96[7], 27.3178(598.2)[c]; see also In re
Robey, 136 Mich App 566, 358 NW2d 362 (1984). The juvenile court's
jurisdiction over matters of child neglect and abuse is concurrent with the
circuit court's jurisdiction over divorce. Therefore, it is not necessary for
a circuit court to waive jurisdiction before the juvenile court may exercise
its powers. Krajewski v Krajewski, 420 Mich 729, 362 NW2d 230 (1984).
MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b] requires the juvenile court to
notify the circuit court with concurrent jurisdiction over a child that a
petition alleging neglect has been filed. The requirements for notification
are set out in MCR 5.927 ~md MCR 3.205. The juvenile court's failure to
give the required notice is not jurisdictional. In re DaBaja, 191 Mich App
281, 477 NW2d 148 (1991). Once notice is provided, the juvenile court
has "unrestricted freedom . . . to carry out its mandate," including the
entry of an order permanently terminating parental rights. Krajewski, 420
Mich at 735; see also In re Albring, 160 Mich App 750, 408 NW2d 545
(1987).
The question whether an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the
juvenile court may be collaterally attacked has been answered differently
by different panels of the court of appeals but was recently resolved in In
re Waite, 188 Mich App 189, 468 NW2d912 (1991). Earlier, some panels
said that jurisdiction may always be attacked, even in a collateral proceeding.ln re Gass, 173 Mich App 444,434 NW2d 427 (1988); In re Emmons,
165 Mich App 701, 419 NW2d 449 (1988); In re Ferris, 151 Mich App
736, 391 NW2d 468 (1986). For the view that the court may always revisit
the legal sufficiency of a petition but may not collaterally attack the
assumption of jurisdiction, see Adrianson and In re Dupras, 140 Mich
App 171, 363 NW2d 26 (1984 ). The Waite court held collateral attack of
the court's jurisdiction is permissible based on either the legal inadequacy
of the allegations in the petition itself or based on the insufficiency of the
evidence offered in support of the allegations. The Waite case involved an
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appeal after <m order terminating parental rights in which the court held
that insufficient facts were testified to at the time of the initial plea,
rendering all proceedings in the case void ab initio. Waite, 188 Mich App
at 208.
Venue for proceedings to determine child neglect or abuse and to
terminate parental rights lies in the juvenile court of the county where the
child is physically found and is not based on the child's place of residence. MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]; see also In re Mathers,
371 Mich 516, 124 NW2d 878 (1963). One juvenile court may transfer
jurisdiction over a child to the juvenile court in the child's county of
residence if the probate judge of the county of residence consents. MCLA
712A.2(d), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[d]. A change of venue may also be
granted for the convenience of the parties and witnesses or if an impartial
trial cannot be held where the case is pending. MCR 5.926(C).
D.

Definitions
§20.4
Definitions for tenns used in the applicable juvenile court
rules are listed at MCR 5.903. Of particular importance is the definition of
father, which defines the proper party for purposes of child protection
proceedings. MCR 5.903(A)(4); see In re Gillespie, 197 Mich App 440,
496 NW2d 309 (1992) (father was held not to be legal father per statutory
definition, and, thus, failure to properly serve him did not void termination of his parental rights).
For purposes of reporting requirements, the terms child abuse and
child neglect are broadly defined at MCLA 722.622, MSA 25.248(2). Note
that the same definitions are not used to define the various bases for taking
jurisdiction over a child in MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]. See
§20.3.
E.

Procedural Summary
§20.5
Child protective proceedings are open to the public. The
courtroom may be closed to the public, on the motion of a party or a
victim, during the testimony of a child or victim to protect the welfare of
either. The factors the court must consider in deciding such a motion are
specified by court rule and statute. MCLA 712A.17(7), MSA
27.3178(598.17)[7]; MCR 5.925(A). (See form 20.1.) Other than confidential files, as defined by MCR 5.903(A)(18), records of the juvenile
court are open to the public. MCR 5.925(D).
A child protection case typically includes the following phases:
1. report of actual or suspected abuse
2. investigation by the Department of Social Services (DSS)
20-7
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filing of a petition
preliminary inquiry (if out-of-home placement is not sought)
preliminary hearing (if out-of-home placement is sought)
pretrial or plea hearing
trial
initial dispositional hearing
review hearings
permanency planning hearing
termination of parental rights hearing or other permanent placement
of child

Steps in this process may be skipped. For example, if a parent enters a no
contest plea to the petition, the trial stage is unnecessary. The case may be
dismissed at any point during this procedure for lack of evidence or due to
the court's finding that the child may be returned to the custody of his or
her parents.
A record must be kept of all hearings on the formal calendar. MCR
5.925(B). The formal calendar is defined as all hearings after the preliminary hearing. MCR 5.903(A)(6).

II. Initiating Child Protective Proceedings
A. Reporting Abuse and Neglect
§20.6
Michigan's Child Protection Law requires certain classes of
persons to report suspected instances of child abuse and neglect or face
possible civil and criminal liability. MCLA 722.623(1), .633, MSA
25.248(3)[1], (13). Those who must report include physicians, coroners,
dentists, medical examiners, nurses, licensed emergency medical care
givers, audiologists, psychologists, family therapists, social workers, social work technicians, school administrators and counselors, teachers, law
enforcement officers, and regulated child care providers. Any of these
persons who has "reasonable cause to suspect" child abuse or neglect
must make an immediate oral report to the state DSS. MCLA 722.623(1),
MSA 25.248(3)[1]. In addition, any person, including a child, who has
reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect may report it to the
DSS or to law enforcement officials. MCLA 722.624, MSA 25.248(4).
Reasonable cause may be based on any number of circumstances or
factors. Child abuse and neglect are broadly defined by the act. MCLA
722.622, MSA 25.248(2). The pregnancy of a child under 12 years old or
venereal disease in a child over one month old but under 12 years old
constitutes reasonable cause to suspect child abuse and neglect have
occurred. MCLA 722.623(8), MSA 25.248(3)[8]. The Child Protection
Law withstood a constitutional challenge in People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich
20-8
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App 706, 432 NW2d 409 (1988), where a psychologist was charged with
failure to report suspected child abuse. But see People v Farrow, 183
Mich App 436, 455 NW2d 325 (1990) (successful due-process challenge
to criminal proceedings by man whose criminal conduct was disclosed by
counselor pursuant to Child Protection Law).
All legally recognized privileges of communication except that between attorney and client are abrogated and "shall neither constitute
grounds for excusing a report otherwise required to be made nor for
excluding evidence in a civil child protective proceeding resulting from a
report made pursuant to this act." MCLA 722.631, MSA 25.248(11). This
abrogation of privilege does not apply when the testimony offered neither
concerned a report of abuse or neglect nor consisted of evidence of abuse
or neglect. See In re Brock, 193 Mich App 652,485 NW2d 110 (1992); In
re Tedder, 150 Mich App 688, 389 NW2d 149 (1986); In re Atkins, 112
Mich App 528, 316 NW2d 477 (1982). When a mother attempted to assert
privilege under federal law protecting records of substance abuse treatment, the trial court correctly balanced the purposes of the state and
federal acts by finding that the state interest in protecting children outweighed the federal interest in protecting the mother's privacy. In re Baby
X, 97 Mich App 111, 293 NW2d 736 (1980). It is not a violation of the
physician-patient privilege if a hospital provides medical information on
children to a department conducting a protective services investigation,
even without a parental release. OAG, 1978, No 5406, at 724 (Dec 15,
1978).
A written report must be filed by the reporting person with the DSS
within 72 hours after making the oral report. The written report must
contain the child's name and a description of the abuse or neglect and,
when possible, the names and addresses of the child's parents, guardian,
or care giver and the child's age. The report must contain other information available to the reporting person that might establish the cause of the
abuse or neglect and how it occurred. MCLA 722.623, MSA 25.248(3).
If the reporting person is a staff member of a hospital, an agency, or
a school, the act requires that notice of the report be given to the person
in charge. A copy of the written report must be made available to the
person in charge. A staff member cannot be dismissed or otherwise penalized for making a required report or for cooperating in an investigation.
MCLA 722.623(1), MSA 25.248(3)[1].
The identity of a reporting person is confidential unless a court orders
disclosure or the reporting person consents to disclosure. "A person acting
in good faith who makes a report, cooperates in an investigation, or assists
in any other requirement of [the] act shall be immune from civil or
criminal liability which might otherwise be incurred . . . ." MCLA
20-9

§20.7

Violence and Neglect

722.625, MSA 25.248(5); see also Awkerman v Tri-County Orthopedic
Group, PC, 143 Mich App 722, 373 NW2d 204 (1985). On the other hand,
"[a] person who knowingly and maliciously makes a false report ... is
guilty of a misdemeanor." MCLA 722.633(5), MSA 25.248(13)[5].
MCLA 722.627, MSA 25.248(7) mandates maintenance by the DSS
of a central registry system, the contents of which are to be available only
to a limited group of specified individuals or entities. The statute allows
inaccurate reports to be amended and records in which no relevant and
accurate evidence of abuse or neglect is found to be expunged. A finding
by the court that there was no neglect or abuse presumes that the report
was not substantiated and must be amended or expunged. OAG, 1978, No
5297, at 430 (Apr 28, 1978).
B.

Investigation by the Department of Social Services
§20.7
The Michigan Department of Social Services (DSS) is
charged by law with taking actions necessary to prevent further abuse, to
protect children, and "to preserve family life where possible." MCLA
722.628(2), MSA 25.248(8)[2]; see also MCLA 400.115b(2), MSA
16.490(25b)[2]. Within 24 hours after receiving a report of suspected
child abuse or neglect, the DSS must begin an investigation of the child
suspected of being abused or neglected. MCLA 722.628(1), MSA
25.248(8)[1).
A report of suspected child abuse or neglect is generally referred to a
children's protective services worker within the DSS. If a case involves
alleged sexual abuse or exploitation, severe physical injury requiring
medical treatment or hospitalization, or death from suspected abuse or
neglect or if the suspected abuse was not committed by a person responsible for the child's health or welfare, the department worker must notify
and seek the assistance of law enforcement within 24 hours. MCLA
722.623(6), MSA 25.248(3)[6]. Furthermore, the DSS must refer reports
involving criminal child abuse, child pornography, or criminal sexual
conduct to the prosecuting attorney. MCLA 722.628(1), MSA
25.248(8)[1]. In the course of investigation, the DSS must cooperate with
law enfon::ement officials, the courts, and appropriate state human services agencies to identify, treat, and prevent child abuse and neglect.
MCLA 722.628, MSA 25.248(8); see also MCLA 400.115b(2), MSA
16.490(25b)[2]. Law enforcement is also directed to cooperate with the
DSS. MCLA 722.628, MSA 25.248(8). If, after an investigation, the
protective services worker believes that the involvement of the juvenile
court is necessary, the worker may file a petition requesting court action.
See MCR 5.961.
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C.

Preliminary Inquiries
§20.8
If the juvenile court receives information that a child is
within the provisions of the juvenile code, the court may conduct a
"preliminary inquiry ... to determine whether the interests of the public
or of the child require that further action be taken." MCLA 712A.11, MSA
27.3178(598.11). A preliminary inquiry is an informal review by the court
to determine appropriate action on a petition. MCR 5.962(A). It is permissible in cases in which there is no request to place the child outside his
or her home. The protective services worker has the discretion to choose a
preliminary inquiry or a preliminary hearing. If a child is taken into
custody, a preliminary hearing is required. See MCR 5.965. (See §20.15.)
At the preliminary inquiry, the court may dismiss the complaint or
deny authorization of the petition, refer the matter to alternative services,
or authorize the filing of a petition on a showing of probable cause that
one or more of the allegations in the petition are true and fall within the
jurisdictional requirements of MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b].
MCR 5.962(B). In a preliminary inquiry, "probable cause may be established with such information and in such a manner as the court deems
sufficient," suggesting that the taking of testimony might not be necessary. MCR 5.962. A referee may conduct a preliminary inquiry. MCR
5.913(A)(l).
D.

Emergency Removal of a Child at Risk
§20.9
The procedure for emergency placement of a child is outlined
in MCR 5.963. Typically, a children's protective services worker explains
the facts ex parte to the judge or referee and submits a petition or complaint requesting court action (form 20.2). This process can occur by
telephone, and the written complaint is often submitted after the child is
removed and placed in protective custody. If the judge or referee finds
there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that home conditions would
endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the child, an order for removal
may be issued. A hearing is not required before removal. The court may
authorize the person to enter a specific premises to remove the child and
may direct the placement of the child in protective custody pending a
preliminary hearing. MCR 5.963(B). DSS workers do not have the authority to remove a child from the parental home without a court order. A peace
officer, on the other hand, may take a child into temporary custody without
a court order "if, after investigation, the officer has reasonable grounds to
conclude that the health, safety, or welfare of the child is endangered."
MCR 5.963(A); see also MCLA 712A.14, MSA 27.3178(598.14).
Under MCR 5.963(C), the person who takes a child into custody
under exigent circumstances, with or without a court order, must
20-11
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(1) immediately attempt to notify the child's parent of the cus-

tody;
(2) inform the parent of the date, time, and place of the preliminary hearing scheduled by the court;
(3) immediately bring the child to the court for preliminary hearing, or immediately contact the court for instruction as to placement
pending preliminary hearing;
(4) if the court is not open, contact the person designated under
MCR 5.934(B)(2) for permission to place or release the child pending
preliminary hearing;
(5) ensure that the petition is prepared and submitted to the court;
(6) prepare a custody statement similar to the statement required
for detention of a juvenile as provided in MCR 5.934(A)(4) and submit
it to the court or leave it at the placement facility.

After emergency placement, a petition is filed with the juvenile court and
a preliminary hearing is held.
An emergency hearing must also be held if a child has remained
home after the taking of jurisdiction and removal of the child from the
home becomes necessary during the dispositional phase of the case. MCR
5.973(E)(3).
E.

Petitions
§20.10 The petition must "set forth plainly the facts which bring
said child within the provisions" of the Juvenile Code (see form 20.3).
The petition must be verified as provided in MCR 2.114(A) and may be
based on information and belief. MCLA 712A.11, MSA 27.3178(598.11);
MCR 5.903(A)(14). MCR 5.961(B) states that the petition must contain, if
known,
(1) the child's name, address, and date of birth;
(2) the names and addresses of:
(a) the child's mother and father,
(b) the parent or person who has custody of the child, if other than
a mother or father;
(c) the nearest known relative of the child, if no parent can be
found, and
(d) any court with prior continuing jurisdiction;
(3) the essential facts which constitute an offense against the child
under the Juvenile Code;
(4) a citation to the section of the Juvenile Code relied upon for
jurisdiction;
(5) the child's membership or eligibility for membership in an
American Indian tribe or band, if any, and the identity of the tribe;
(6) the type of relief requested, including whether temporary or
permanent custody is sought.

If the petitioner does not know required information, the petition should
20-12
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state that. The petition "may be amended at any stage of the proceedings,
as the ends of justice may require." MCLA 712A.ll, MSA
27.3178(598.11). In In re Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 375 NW2d 788 (1985),
a petition to terminate parental rights did not violate the mother's right to
due process even though it did not include her name and did not cite the
specific statutory basis for permanent custody since it was amended to
include her name and it specified the grounds for neglect.
If the court requests, the prosecuting attorney must prepare the petition or review it for legal sufficiency. MCR 5.914(A).

III. The Judicial Process
A.

Right to Counsel
§20.11 A child has a right to counsel in child protective proceedings
that may not be waived. MCLA 712A.17c(7), MSA 27.3178(598.17c)[7];
MCR 5.915(B)(2). Indeed, the Child Protection Law directs the court to
appoint legal counsel to represent the child "in every case filed under this
act in which judicial proceedings are necessary." The attorney is charged
with "the representation of the child's best interests." The attorney is
required to "make further investigation as he deems necessary to ascertain
the facts, interview witnesses, examine witnesses in both the adjudicatory
and dispositional hearings, make recommendations to the court, and participate in the proceedings to competently represent the child." MCLA
722.630, MSA 25.248(10). The child's attorney may have access to hospital records regarding the child under this section. OAG, 1979, No 5446, at
59 (Feb 23, 1979).
The court may also appoint a guardian ad litem for a party if the
party's welfare so requires. The guardian ad litem has a right to copies of
all petitions, motions, and orders. He or she may consult with the attorney
for the party for whom the guardian ad litem has been appointed. MCR
5.916. Attorneys appointed to represent children under MCR 5.915(B)(2)
are often referred to as guardians ad litem, but the court rules specifically
differentiate those two roles, allowing for the possibility that the child
will have both an attorney and a guardian ad litem.
Under MCR 5.915(B)(1), the respondent is entitled to courtappointed counsel at child protective proceedings conducted pursuant to
the juvenile court rules if the court is convinced after reviewing the record
that the respondent is financially unable to retain an attorney and desires
representation. The court must advise the respondent at his or her first
court appearance of the right to retain an attorney and of the right to
court-appointed counsel if the respondent is financially unable to retain an
attorney. A respondent may waive the right to counsel unless the respondent is a minor whose parent or guardian objects to the waiver. The court
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may assess the costs for a court-appointed attorney against the party or a
person responsible for the support of that party and may enforce the
assessment by contempt proceedings. An attorney appointed under this
rule serves until discharged by the court. See also MCLA 712A.17c(4)(6), MSA 27.3178(598.17c)[4]-[6]. Practice in Michigan juvenile courts
varies on the availability of appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing.
See D. Duquette, Michigan Child Welfare Law: Child Protection, Foster
Care, Termination of Parental Rights 62-63 (1990).
At any point in the proceedings that termination of parental rights is
being considered, the juvenile court must, on its own motion, appoint
counsel for indigent parents unless such a right is expressly waived. In re
Lockett, 160 Mich App 319, 408 NW2d 144 (1987); In re Keifer, 159
Mich App 288, 406 NW2d 217 (1987).
The right to counsel includes the right to competent counsel. In re
Rogers, 160 Mich App 500, 409 NW2d 486 (1987); In re Trowbridge, 155
Mich App 785, 401 NW2d 65 (1986). Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights are analyzed by analogy to the test applied in criminal cases. !d. A bifurcated test is applied.
The first branch of the test focuses on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The standard for this test is set forth in Beasley v United States,
491 F2d 687, 696 (6th Cir 1974), and was endorsed by the Michigan
Supreme Court in People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 247 NW2d 547 (1976):
"Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary
training and skill in the criminal law and must conscientiously protect his
client's interests, undeflected by conflicting considerations." The second
branch of the test requires the appellate court to examine particular mistakes to safeguard the defendant's right to a fair trial. The standard for
this test was set forth in Garcia: "However, even where assistance of
counsel satisfies the constitutional requirements, defendant is still entitled
to a fair trial. Defendant can be denied this right if his attorney makes a
serious mistake. But a court should not grant a new trial unless it finds
that but for this mistake defendant would have had a reasonably likely
chance of acquittal." Garcia, 398 Mich at 266; see also People v Coyle,
104 Mich App 636, 305 NW2d 275 (1981).
Court-appointed counsel may also be available to respondents on
appeal. MCR 5.974(H); see also In re Sanchez, 422 Mich 758, 375 NW2d
353 (1985).
The petitioner, the DSS, may be represented by the prosecutor, at the
request of the court, at any child protective proceeding. The prosecutor
must also serve as a "legal consultant" to the DSS, at the agency's
request, at all stages of a child protective proceeding. When the prosecutor does not appear on behalf of the DSS, the agency may retain
20-14

Child Protection Law and Procedure

independent legal representation. MCLA 712A.17(4)-(5),
27.3178(598.17)[4]-[5]; MCR 5.914. (See form 20.4.)
B.

§20.12
MSA

Evidence and Standard of Proof
§20.12 At trial and at any time the court is presented with proof of
a new allegation, the Michigan Rules of Evidence apply. MCR
5.972(C)(1) (trial); MCR 5.974(D)(3) (termination of parental rights at
initial disposition); MCR 5.974(E)(l) (termination of parental rights on
the basis of changed circumstances). At all other hearings, the court may
receive all relevant and material evidence. The evidence "may be relied
on to the extent of its probative value, even though such evidence may not
be admissible at trial." MCR 5.973(A)(4) (initial dispositional hearing);
MCR 5.973(8)(5) (dispositional review hearings); MCR 5.973(C)(4)(a)
(permanency planning hearing); MCR 5.974(F)(2) (termination of parental
rights or child in foster care). The admission of hearsay at hearings on the
termination of parental rights has withstood constitutional challenge. In re
Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 361 NW2d 20 (1984); In re Hinson, 135 Mich
App 472, 354 NW2d 794 (1984). At the preliminary hearing, the applicable court rule is silent on the admission of hearsay evidence on the issue
of probable cause but states that the court's decision to place a child out
of the home "may be on the basis of hearsay evidence that possesses <m
adequate degree of trustworthiness." MCR 5.965(C)(3). The practice in
juvenile court is to generally permit the admission of hearsay evidence on
all issues presented at the preliminary hearing.
The rules that pennit the admission of all relevant and material
evidence specifically include the admission of oral and written reports.
The rules require that opposing parties be given an opportunity to "examine and controvert" written reports and that counsel "may be allowed to
cross-examine individuals making reports when such individuals are reasonably available." See MCR 5.973(A)(4)(b) (initial dispositional hearing); MCR 5.973(B)(5) (dispositional review hearing); MCR 5.973(C)(4)
(permanency planning hearing); MCR 5.973(E)(4) (change in placement);
MCR 5.974(F)(2) (termination of parental rights, child in foster care).
Even when the legal basis for the termination of parental rights must
be established through legally admissible evidence, all relevant and material evidence may be admitted to establish that termination is in the best
interests of the child. MCR 5.974(D)(4), (E)(2).
A form of the tender years exception to the hearsay rule has been
created for trials in child protective proceedings. MCR 5.972(C)(2) allows
into evidence a statement by a child abuse victim under I 0 years of age
describing <m act of abuse, even though the statement would otherwise be
inadmissible hearsay. The court must find, at a hearing before trial, that the
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nature and circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement are
trustworthy and that there is "sufficient corroborative evidence of the act."
The court in In re Brimer, 191 Mich App 401, 478 NW2d 689 (1991), set
forth various factors to consider in determining the reliability of a child's
out-of-court statements. In In re Brock, 193 Mich App 652,485 NW2d 110
(1992), the court criticized the trial court for not making specific findings
under MCR 5.972(C)(2). Note that for criminal and delinquency matters,
there is a similar tender years exception set out in MRE 803A.
Often a child's out-of-court statements are offered under MRE
803(4), the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule.
In People v Meeboer, 439 Mich 310, 484 NW2d 621 (1992), the Michigan
Supreme Court consolidated three cases in which a treating medical health
care provider was called to testify to the child's statements concerning
abuse and the identity of the abuser. The court held that for admission
under MRE 803(4), it must first be established that the child understood
the need to tell the truth to the physician. To prove the child's understanding of the need to tell the truth, the court should look at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement. It should consider
factors such as the age and maturity of the child, the manner in which the
statements are elicited and phrased, the use of terminology unexpected of
a child of similar age, the person who initiated the examination, the
statement's timing in relation to the assault and trial, the type of examination, the relation of the child to the person identified as the assailant, and
the existence or lack of motivation to fabricate. The reliability of the
statement is strengthened when supported by other evidence, such as
corroborating physical evidence, evidence that the alleged assailant had
an opportunity to commit the assault, and the resulting diagnosis and
treatment of the child. As a second step, the statement must have been
reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment. See also White v lllinois, 112 S Ct 736 (1992); Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805 (1990).
Other special evidentiary principles have developed in child protective proceedings. Evidence of how a parent treats one child is admissible
to show how that parent might treat other children. In re Andeson, 155
Mich App 615, 400 NW2d 330 (1986); In re Futch, 144 Mich App 163,
375 NW2d 375 (1984); In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich App 219,263 NW2d
37 (1977); In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 210 NW2d 482 (1973).
Moreover, evidence admitted at one hearing may be considered evidence at all subsequent hearings. In re Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 375
NW2d 788 (1985); In re Adrianson, 105 Mich App 300, 306 NW2d 487
(1981); In re Sharpe, 68 Mich App 619, 243 NW2d 696 (1976); LaFlure.
In addition, evidence regarding the parents' activities up to the date of the
tennination hearing, including the facts leading to the original petition
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that prompted placing the child in the temporary custody of the court, is
admissible. Adrianson; LaFlure.
Expert medical, psychological, and social work information is often
presented to or requested by the juvenile court judge to resolve issues in
cases of child abuse and neglect. See, e.g., In reA/bring, 160 Mich App
750, 408 NW2d 545 (1987); In re Ferris, 151 Mich App 736, 391 NW2d
468 (1986); In re Rinesmith, 144 Mich App 475, 376 NW2d 139 (1985).
"No assertion of an evidentiary privilege, other than the privilege between
attorney and client, shall prevent the receipt and use, at the dispositional
phase, of materials prepared pursuant to a court-ordered examination,
interview, or course of treatment." MCR 5.973(A)(4)(c). For expert testimony that was not court-ordered, see the discussion of privilege in §20.6.
At trial, the petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. MCR 5.972(C)(1). Except as provided in MCR 5.980 concerning American Indian children, the petitioner has the burden of proof
in an action to terminate parental rights and must prove the case by "clear
and convincing" evidence. MCR 5.974; see also Santosky v Kramer, 455
US 745 (1982); LaFlure. The petitioner has a higher burden of proof in a
case involving an American Indian child: the burden of proof is beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See §20.39.)
C.

Child Witnesses
§20.13 In cases involving a child witness, MCLA 712A.17b, MSA
27.3178(598.17b) should be consulted. A witness covered by this section is a person under 15 years of age or a person 15 years of age or
older with a developmental disability. MCLA 712A.17b(l)(b), MSA
27.3178(598.17b)[1][b]. The statute permits the following methods for
protecting witnesses:

1. the use of dolls to assist the witness in testifying on direct or crossexamination, MCLA 712A.17b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[3]
2. the use of a support person to sit with, accompany, or be in close
proximity to the witness (notice must be given to the court and other
parties before the hearing of the intent to use a support person and of
the identity of a support person, MCLA 712A.17b(4), MSA
27 .3178(598.17b)[4])
3. the use of a videotape statement of a witness by an investigating
agency at all proceedings except the adjudication (trial), MCLA
712A.17b(5), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[5]
4. if the court finds on the record that the witness would suffer psychological harm if she or he testified at trial, a videotaped deposition
may be used at trial in lieu of the witness's testimony, MCLA
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712A.17b(9), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[9] (The witness may also be
shielded from seeing the respondent during the videotaped deposition. MCLA 712A.17b(9), MSA 27.3178(598.17b)[9].)
The court rules allow the use of closed-circuit television, speaker telephone, or "other similar electronic equipment" to protect the parties or
facilitate court hearings. Further, "[t]he court may appoint an impartial
psychologist or psychiatrist to ask questions of a child witness at a
hearing." MCR 5.923(0) and (E).
Constitutional challenges to the use of videotaped testimony under
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment were addressed in Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836 (1990). The trial judge must make a particularized finding that the witness protections are necessary in each case.
Although the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, by its terms,
applies only to criminal cases, the court in In re Brock, 193 Mich App
652, 485 NW2d 110 (1992), extended its protection in the name of due
process to child protective proceedings as well. See also In re Vanidestine,
186 Mich App 205, 463 NW2d 225 (1990).
D.

Notice of Hearing
§20.14 A summons may be issued and served on a party before a
proceeding in juvenile court (form 20.5). However, the court must direct
the service of a summons on the parent or person with whom the minor
resides for the trial or hearing on a petition seeking termination of parental rights. MCR 5.920(B). But see MCR 5.920(F) (subsequent notices).
The summons must identify the nature of the hearing, explain the right to
counsel and the right to trial by judge or jury, and give "prominent notice"
that the hearings could result in termination of parental rights. A copy of
the petition must be attached. MCR 5.920(8)(3); see In re Gillespie, 197
Mich App 440, 496 NW2d 309 (1992) (father was held not to be legal
father per statutory definition, and, thus, failure to properly serve him did
not void termination of his parental rights). The manner and time of
service of summons must comply with MCR 5.920 and MCLA 712A.l3,
MSA 27.3178(598.13).
The respondent, the respondent's attorney, the child or the child's
attorney, a parent or guardian (if other than the respondent), the petitioner,
and the guardian ad litem of a party must be notified of each hearing,
except for dispositional review, permanency planning, and termination of
parental rights hearings. MCR 5.921(8)(1). For proof of service see form
20.6. For review and permanency planning hearings, the following persons must be notified pursuant to MCR 5.921 (B )(2):
I. the agency responsible for the care of the child (usually the DSS)
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2. the foster parent or custodian of the child,
3. the parents and the attorney for the parents unless parental rights
have been terminated
4. the guardian of the child
5. the guardian ad litem for the child
6. the attorney for the child
7. the child, if 11 years old or older
8. any tribal leader, if there is tribal affiliation
9. any other person as directed by the court
For a termination of parental rights hearing, all those listed in MCR
5.921(B)(2), plus the prosecuting attorney, must be notified. MCR
5.921(B)(3).
Notice may be given in any manner authorized by the rules in subchapter 5.900. Notice of a hearing must be given in writing or on the
record at least seven days before the hearing unless otherwise provided in
the court rules. When a child is placed through an emergency placement,
notice of the preliminary hearing must be given to the parent as soon as
the hearing is scheduled and may be in person, written, on the record, or
by telephone. MCR 5.920. A noncustodial parent must be notified of the
first hearing on the petition, but notice of subsequent hearings is only
required if the noncustodial parent requests it. MCR 5.921(C). Notification to putative fathers is governed by MCR 5.921(D).
The summons requirements are jurisdictional. If they are not met,
jurisdiction is not established and orders issued from the proceedings are
void. The fact that a respondent had actual notice does not cure this
jurisdictional error. In re Adair, 191 Mich App 710, 478 NW2d 667
(1991); In re Brown, 149 Mich App 529, 386 NW2d 577 (1986). However,
any party who voluntarily appears at the proceedings may waive service
of process or notice of hearing in writing. MCR 5.920(E); see also In re
Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 375 NW2d 788 (1985). The court of appeals has
concluded that it is not necessary to serve a respondent personally with a
petition and summons to a rescheduled hearing if the respondent was
personally served notice of the originally scheduled hearing, appeared at
it, agreed to the adjournment, and had actual notice of the rescheduled
hearing date. In re Andeson, 155 Mich App 615, 400 NW2d 330 (1986);
see also MCR 5.920(F). In In re Render, 145 Mich App 344, 377 NW2d
421 (1985), the court of appeals ruled that due process requires that an
incarcerated parent receive notice and an opportunity to appear and present evidence when a parental termination proceeding is commenced.
Silence, even after notice of the proceeding, will not be taken as a waiver
of the right to appear when the respondent is in the custody of the state.
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E.

Preliminary Hearings
§20.15 MCR 5.965 sets out the requirements for a preliminary hearing. The court rule reflects the standards for authorizing a petition and
for placing the child, which are set out in MCLA 712A.13a, MSA
27.3178(598.13a). The court must hold a preliminary hearing within 24
hours (excluding Sundays and holidays) after a child has been taken into
court custody, "unless adjourned for good cause," or the child must be
released. MCR 5.965(A).
At the preliminary hearing, the judge or referee must determine that a
parent has been notified and, if the parent is not present, direct that an
attempt be made to secure the parent's presence. The court may adjourn
the preliminary hearing to secure the appearance of a parent or conduct
the hearing in the parent's absence. The court must appoint an attorney to
represent the child at the hearing, but the court may make temporary
orders to protect the child pending the appearance of counsel or the
completion of the preliminary hearing. The allegations in the petition
must be read in open court, unless waived. The respondent must be
advised of the right to counsel. MCR 5.965(B)(5).
At the preliminary hearing, the court may dismiss the petition, refer
the matter to alternative services, or proceed with the hearing. The court
must advise the respondent of the right to trial and that the trial may be
conducted by a referee unless the respondent files a written demand for a
judge or a jury pursuant to MCR 5.911 or 5.912. The court must inquire
whether the child or parent is a registered member of an American Indian
tribe or whether the child is eligible for membership. If so, MCR 5.980
must be observed. (See §20.39.) The court must also allow the respondent
to deny or admit the allegations in the petition and to explain. MCR 5.965(B).
The judge or referee must decide whether to authorize the petition to
be filed and, if so, whether the child should be released to the parent or
placed pending trial. The court may authorize the petition "upon a showing of probable cause, unless waived, that one or more of the allegations
in the petition are true" and fall within the jurisdictional requirements of
MCLA 712A.2(b), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b]. MCR 5.965(B)(9).
If the court authorizes the petition and does not release the child to
the parent's custody, the court must receive evidence to establish the
criteria for placement. To place the child with someone other than a
parent, the following conditions must exist:

1. Custody with the parent presents "a substantial risk of harm to the
life, physical health, or mental well being of the child."
2. No alternative services are available to protect the child from those
risks in his or her parent's home.
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3. The conditions of the placement away from the parent "are adequate
to safeguard the h~alth and welfare of the child."
MCR 5.965(C)(2). These conditions reflect the policy that a child should
be placed with a parent unless no services are available to protect the
child in the home and only when the alternative placement is safer than
the parent's home.
The respondent must "be given an opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses, to subpoena witnesses, and to offer proof to counter the allegations" of the petition. However, the court's findings "may be on the basis
of hearsay evidence that possesses an adequate degree of trustworthiness.
. . . [T]he court may adjourn the hearing for up to 14 days to secure the
attendance of witnesses or for other good cause shown." MCR 5.965(C).
The requirement to determine probable cause to place a child in foster
care pending trial is not jurisdictional. In re A/bring, 160 Mich App 750,
480 NW2d 545 (1987).
If the court orders a child placed, the judge or referee must make a
written statement of findings or place them on the record. MCR
5.965(C)(3). A child removed from his or her home due to abuse or
neglect must be placed in the "most family-like setting consistent with the
needs of the child." MCR 5.9i55(C)(4). A child removed from his or her
home due to abuse or neglect may not be detained in any secure juvenile
detention facility or adult jail. MCLA 712A.15, MSA 27.3178(598.15). A
respondent parent, guardian, or custodian has no right to post bail for the
release of a child when the child is removed from the home due to alleged
abuse or neglect. MCR 5.956(C)(5).
When ordering placement, the court must inform the parties that an
initial services plan will be submitted by the DSS no later than 30 days
after placement, that participation in the plan is voluntary unless the court
orders otherwise, and what elements are required in the service plan.
MCR 5.965(C)(6). In In re Macomber, 436 Mich 386, 399-400, 461
NW2d 671 (1990), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the juvenile
court could not order a father out of his home before trial, thus denying
the juvenile court the power to make orders affecting adults until after the
adjudication (trial) stage.
The court rule encourages frequent visitation between the parent and
child, pending trial, unless even supervised visitation would hann the
child. MCR 5.965(C)(7). Finally, on the motion of a party, the court is
required to review orders of custody, placement, or the service plan ~md
"may modify those orders and plan if it is in the best interest of the child."
MCR 5.965(C)(8).
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F.

Entering a Plea
§20.16 "A respondent may make a plea of admission or of no
contest to the original charge in the petition.". MCR 5.971(A). In its
discretion, the court may allow the respondent to plead to an amended
petition. The plea may be taken at any time after the petition is filed, as
long as the petitioner <md counsel for the child first have an opportunity to
object. I d. Before accepting a plea, the court must advise the respondent
on the record or in writing of certain rights and that the respondent's plea
can be used later to terminate parental rights. MCR 5.971(B).
The plea must be both voluntary and accurate. The court must satisfy
itself that the plea is knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made.
MCR 5.971(C)(l). The court does not have to specifically inquire whether
the plea is knowingly made as long as the court is satisfied that it is. In re
King, 186 Mich App 458, 465 NW2d 1 (1990). To find that a plea was
accurately made, the court must find support that the child comes within
the court's jurisdiction, "preferably by questioning the respondent unless
the offer is to plead no contest." For a no contest plea, the court must
"obtain support for a finding that the respondent committed the offense
against the child" apart from questioning the respondent. "The court shall
state why a plea of no contest is appropriate." MCR 5.971(C)(2). The
court in In re Waite, 188 Mich App 189, 195, 208,468 NW2d 912 (1991),
held that a mother's plea to a petition alleging neglect because her child
was abused in the care of another was insufficiently supported by testimony presented at the time of the plea, rendering the plea and all subsequent proceedings void. In addition, see In re Zelzack, 180 Mich App 117,
446 NW2d 588 (1989), holding a father was not permitted to withdraw his
no contest plea since evidence existed to support a finding of neglect.
G.

Pretrial Procedures
§20.17 Pretrial procedures are governed by MCR 5.922. The following materials are discoverable as of right if they are requested no later
than 21 days before trial: all written or recorded statements and notes of
statements in the possession or control of the petitioner or a law enforcement agency; all written or recorded nonconfidential statements from any
person with knowledge of the events, including police reports; the names
of prospective witnesses; a list of tangible evidence; reports from any
experts and the results of tests or experiments that are prospective evidence; the results of any lineups or showups; and any search warrants,
including applications for warrants, affidavits, and returns or inventories.
The court may permit the discovery of other materials or grant an untimely request for materials as specified in MCR 5.922(A)(2). But (f. In re
Lemmer, 191 Mich App 253, 477 NW2d 503 (1991) (court may not order
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interviews of children). Motion practice in juvenile court is governed by
MCR 2.119, except that a motion to suppress evidence must be filed at
least seven days before the trial or at the trial in the court's discretion.
MCR 5.922(C).
The juvenile court has the authority to order further investigation or
discovery, including the examination of a child by a physician, dentist,
psychologist, or psychiatrist. MCLA 712A.12, MSA 27.3178(598.12);
MCR 5.923. At "any time," the court may order the discovery of "other
evidence," which may include physical or mental examinations of parents.
ld.; see also MCLA 712A.6, MSA 27.3178(598.6). The court may order a
parent to undergo a psychological examination for the purpose of determining whether parental rights should be terminated. In re Johnson, I42
Mich App 764, 371 NW2d 446 (I985).
Pretrial conferences in probate court are governed by MCR 5.922(D),
which states that the scope and effect of a pretrial conference are governed by MCR 2.40I unless inconsistent with the rules of subchapter
5.900. The court may direct the parties to appear to settle all pretrial
matters. Pretrial conferences may serve to clarify the status of a case,
identify legai issues to be briefed, exchange witness lists and exhibits, and
set a trial date if the case cannot be resolved without a trial. The parties
might wish to negotiate visitation, the placement of the child, and the case
plan for the family. To avoid temporary court jurisdiction, parents might
be willing to begin counseling or accept services that the DSS feels are
necessary to protect the child. The DSS may agree to amend the petition
or to delete certain allegations in exchange for a plea of admission or no
contest by the respondent under MCR 5.97I(A).
H. Trial
§20.18 If the allegations of the petition are contested, a trial must
be held. Before the adoption of the court rules effective January I, I988,
this proceeding was referred to as the "adjudicative phase." (See former
MCR 5.908(A).)
A trial must be held six months after the filing of a petition if the
child is not placed. If the child is placed outside his or her home, the trial
must begin as soon as possible and no later than 63 days after the child is
placed by the court unless (I) the parties stipulate to delay, (2) proper
service cannot be completed, or (3) the court finds that the testimony of a
witness who is not currently available is needed: If trial is postponed for
reasons (2) or (3), the child must be returned to the parent unless release
is likely to result in "physical harm or serious emotional damage to the
child." MCR 5.972(A).
At trial, the court must ascertain the presence of the proper parties.
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The respondent has the right to be present, but the court may proceed in
the respondent's absence if notice has been served on the respondent;
children may be excused as the court determines their interests require.
The allegations in the petition must be read unless waived, and the nature
of the proceedings explained. MCR 5.972(B). See §20.11 regarding the
parties' right to counsel.
The parties have the right to a judge at trial. To demand a nonjury
trial by a judge rather than a referee, a party must file a written demand
with the court within the time periods specified in MCR 5.91l(B) and
MCR 5.912(B). A judge must preside at a jury trial. MCR 5.912.
There is a right to a jury only during the trial; there is no right to a
jury at the dispositional hearing. MCR 5.9ll(A). "Any person interested
in the hearing" or the court may demand a jury of six. MCLA 712A.l7(2),
MSA 27.3178(598.17)[2]. A written request for a jury must be filed with
the juvenile court within the time periods established in MCR 5.911(B).
Jury procedure in the juvenile division of the juvenile court is governed
by MCR 2.510-.516 unless otherwise provided in MCR 5.911(C). In a
child protective proceeding, a verdict is to be received when five of the
six jurors agree. I d.
Also see §20.12.
I.

Initial Dispositional Hearing
§20.19 Following a trial or a plea of admission or no contest, the
court holds a dispositional hearing to determine what measures it should
take with respect to the child and, when applicable, any adults within its
jurisdiction. The time interval, if any, between trial and disposition is
within the court's discretion. However, if a child is in placement, the
interval may not be more than 35 days unless there is "good cause." MCR
5.973(A). The child need not be present as long as the child's guardian ad
litem or the child's attorney is present. The respondent has the right to be
present or may be represented by counsel, but the court may proceed
without the parties if proper notice has been given. /d.
If the court finds that a child about whom a petition has been filed is
not within the provisions of the juvenile code, the court must dismiss the
petition. If, however, the court finds that the child is within the provisions
of the code, the court may enter an order of disposition that is "appropriate for the welfare of the child and society in view of the facts proven <md
ascertained." MCLA 712A.l8, MSA 27.3178(598.18).
Dispositional alternatives include

1. warning the child or the parents, guardian, or custodian and dismissing the petition;
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2. placing the child on probation or under supervision in his or her own
home or the home of an adult related to the child, with reasonable
rules for the conduct of the parents, guardian, or custodian;
3. placing the child in a licensed foster home;
4. placing the child in a private institution or agency licensed by the
state;
5. committing the child to a public institution or county facility operated as an agency of the court or county;
6. providing the child with medical, dental, surgical, or other health care
and with clothing and other incidental items as the court deems
necessary;
7. ordering the parents, guardian, custodian, or any other person to
refrain from continuing whatever conduct the court believes caused
or tended to cause the child to come within the provisions of the
juvenile code; and
8. appointing a guardian for the child under MCLA 700.424, MSA
27.5424 and dismissing the petition under MCLA 712A.18, MSA
27 .3178(598.18).
The court may order the parent or legally responsible adult to reimburse the court for the cost of the child's care and the cost of attorney fees
to the extent of that person's financial ability. I d.
The juvenile court's jurisdiction is not limited to the dispositions
listed in MCLA 712A.18, MSA 27.3178(598.18). In re Macomber, 436
Mich 386, 399-400, 461 NW2d 671 (1990) (ordering father out of his
home and requiring him to pay child support fell within juvenile court's
dispositional powers). However, notice and an opportunity for hearing are
necessary before such orders are valid. MCLA 712A.18(4), MSA
27 .3178(598.18)[4]. The court may also order the termination of parental
rights at the initial disposition (see §20.23).
If an agency recommends placing a child outside the home, it must
report in writing the efforts made to prevent the removal of the child or to
rectify the conditions that caused the removal. The report must specify
what services were provided to the family or, if services were not provided, the reasons why. Furthermore, the report must indicate the likely
harm to the child if the child is either separated from or returned to the
parent. MCLA 712A.18f, MSA 27.3178(598.18f). The agency must also
prepare a case service plan, which must be available to the court and all
the parties before the entry of a dispositional order. The plan must include
(1) the type of placement and the reasons for the requested placement; (2)
what the parent must do to have the child returned; (3) what efforts the
agency will make to return the child to his or her home; (4) the services to
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be provided the family and foster home to facilitate the child's return to
the parents; and (5) unless even supervised visitation would be harmful, a
schedule for regular and frequent visitation not less than once every seven
days. MCLA 712A.18f(3), MSA 27.3178(598.18[)[3]. The court must
consider the case service plan before entering a dispositional order.
MCLA 712A.18f(4), MSA 27.3178(598.18[)[4]; MCR 5.973(A)(5)(b). In
keeping with the requirments of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, the court must include in the order, if appropriate, a finding that
the agency made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child or
to rectify the conditions that caused the removal. MCR 5.973(A)(5)(c). If
the child continues in placement outside of his or her home, the plan must
be revised and updated every 90 days. MCLA 712A.18f(5), MSA
27 .3178(598.18[)[5]. In its dispositional order, the court must state
whether the child is placed in the temporary or permanent custody of the
court. MCLA 712A.20, MSA 27.3178(598.20).
Also see §20.12.

J,

Review Hearings
§20.20 MCLA 712A.19, MSA 27.3178(598.19) and MCR
5.973(8)(2) require that if a child is placed out of the home, a review
hearing must be held no more than 91 days after the initial disposition
order and every 91 days after for the first year. After the first year, review
hearings must occur every 182 days. The court may decide to shorten the
interval between review hearings. MCR 5.973(8)(3). Review hearings are
subject to the same procedures and rules of evidence as dispositional
hearings. MCR 5.973(8)(5).
The agency responsible for the care of the child must submit an
updated service plan at each 91-day review hearing. The report shall be
available to the court and to all parties. MCLA 712A.18f(5), MSA
27.3178(598.18[)[5]. It must be offered into evidence. MCLA 712A.19,
MSA 27.3178(598.19). MCR 5.973(8)(6) sets out the criteria the court
should use in reviewing the status of the case at the review hearing: the
services provided, whether the parent has benefited from the services, and
the extent of parental visitation. MCR 5.973(8)(7) lists the supplemental
orders available to the court at the review hearing, including the return of
the child without a hearing. See also MCLA 712A.19, MSA
27 .3178(598.19).
K.

Permanency Planning Hearing
§20.21 Legislation in 1988 established a new step in the child
protection process called a permanency planning hearing. MCLA
712A.19a, MSA 27.3178(598.19a); MCR 5.973(C). If a child remains in
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foster care and parental rights to the child have not been terminated, the
court must conduct a permanency planning hearing not more than 364
days after the entry of the initial dispositional order and every 364 days
after if the child continues in foster care. The purpose of the hearing is to
determine either why the child should not be returned home or why
parental rights to the child should not be terminated. The court is to
attempt to establish a permanent placement for the child, either with his or
her parents or through termination and adoption.
If the court determines that returning the child "would not cause a
substantial risk of harm to the child's life, physical health, or mental
well-being, the court shall order the child returned to his or her parent."
The court is to view a parent's failure to substantially comply with the
case service plan as evidence that returning the child would cause a
substantial risk of harm to the child. MCLA 712A.19a(4), MSA
27.3178(598.19a)[4]; MCR 5.973(C).
If the court determines that the child should not be returned to his or
her parent, the agency must initiate proceedings to terminate parental
rights within 42 days unless the agency demonstrates that termination is
clearly not in the child's best interest. MCLA 712A.19a(5), MSA
27.3178(598.19a)[5]; MCR 5.973(C)(4)(c). However, filing the petition
after 42 days does not necessitate the dismissal of the case or the setting
aside of the termination order on appeal. In re Prater, 189 Mich App 330,
471 NW2d 658 (1991); In re Kirkwood, 187 Mich App 542, 468 NW2d
280 (1991). If the child is not returned, termination proceedings are not
initiated, and the court determines that other pennanent placements are
not possible; the court must order either short- or long-term foster care.
MCLA 712A.19a(6), MSA 27.3178(598.19a)[6]; MCR 5.973(C)(4)(d).

IV. Termination of Parental Rights
A.

Introduction
§20.22 Generally, courts are reluctant to terminate parental rights
without first trying to reunite the family. In re Mathers, 371 Mich 516,
124 NW2d 878 (1963). A situation justifying temporary custody does not
necessarily justify the termination of parental rights. In re LaFlure, 48
Mich App 377, 210 NW2d 482 (1973). Any termination of parental rights
must be based on circumstances that establish or seriously threaten longterm neglect or severe abuse. Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 92 NW2d 604
(1958). The termination of parental rights severs the rights of the natural
parents to their child. MCLA 712A.20, MSA 27.3178(598.20); Fritts. The
proper inquiry in these cases is whether the state has proved that the
respondent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence according to statutory standards, not whether the child would be better off in foster care. In
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re Bedwell, 160 Mich App 168, 408 NW2d 65 (1987).

The petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that statutory grounds for termination exist. MCR 5.974(A)(2);
see also In re Schejbal, 131 Mich App 833, 346 NW2d 597 (1984); In re
Atkins, 112 Mich App 528, 316 NW2d 477 (1982). (Note that the burden
of proof is higher in termination cases involving American Indian children. See §20.39.) Once that standard is met, the juvenile court should
consider the best interests of the child in exercising its power to terminate
parental rights. MCR 5.974(A)(1); In re Tedder, 150 Mich App 688, 389
NW2d 149 (1986); In re McDuel, 142 Mich App 479, 369 NW2d 912
(1985); Schejbal. Both steps may be accomplished at one hearing. MCR
5.974(A)(l). There is no right to a jury trial at proceedings to terminate
parental rights. MCR 5.974(A)(2); see also In re Oakes, 53 Mich App
629, 220 NW2d 188 (1974).
For the purpose of termination hearings, respondent includes the
natural or adoptive mother of the child and the father of the child as
defined by MCR 5.903(A)(4). The word does not include any other persons. MCR 5.974(B). Also see §20.14, describing the special notice requirements for hearings for the termination of parental rights.
Parental rights may not be terminated unless termination was requested in an original, an amended, or a supplemental petition filed by the
prosecutor, an agency, or a representative of the child and served on the
respondent as required by MCR 5.920. MCR 5.974(A), (C). MCLA
712A.19b(l), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[1] was recently amended to permit
the filing of a petition for the termination of parental rights by a guardian
or custodian of the child as well. Form 20.3 is used to petition for the
termination of parental rights, with the factual allegations attached on a
separate sheet of paper. Adoptive parents lack standing to petition for the
termination of their own parental rights. In re Swope, 190 Mich App 478,
476 NW2d 459 (1991). An order terminating parental rights under the
juvenile code may not be entered unless the court makes findings of fact
and states conclusions of law on the record or in a written opinion and
includes the statutory basis for the order within 28 days after the proofs.
MCR 5.974(G).
The juvenile court has the authority, at the initial dispositional hearing, to terminate parental rights under certain circumstances. MCR
5.974(0). However, if the court places the child in foster care at the initial
dispositional hearing, the court may later consider whether to terminate
parental rights under MCLA 712A.19b, MSA 27.3178(598.19b); MCR
5.974(E), (F). Most Michigan cases that result in the termination of
parental rights are decided under this statute after the court has provided
an opportunity for the parents to correct the problems that initially
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brought the child under the jurisdiction of the court. However, there is no
constitutional or statutory right to the preservation of the family unit. Doe
v Oettle, 97 Mich App 183, 293 NW2d 760 (1980).
If there is clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds for
termination, the court may conditionally terminate parental rights, giving
parents an opportunity to comply with the listed conditions and have the
termination order set aside. In re Adrianson, 105 Mich App 300, 306
NW2d 487 (1981). But see Bedwell (criticizing this procedure).
The issue whether the court may terminate the rights of only one
parent under the juvenile code has not been clear. The court rules appear
to allow the rights of one parent to be terminated in child protective
proceedings. MCR 5.974. The Michigan Supreme Court has indicated that
a juvenile court must make findings that support terminating the rights of
each parent and may terminate the rights of only one parent. In re Arntz,
418 Mich 941, 344 NW2d 1 (1984); see also In re Campbell, 129 Mich
App 780, 342 NW2d 607 (1983). A parent may voluntarily consent to
termination of his or her parental rights, which would not require the
juvenile court to announce a statutory basis for termination. In re Toler,
193 Mich App 474, 484 NW2d 672 (1992).
The Michigan Adoption Code clearly allows the court to terminate
the parental rights of one parent under certain circumstances. E.g., MCLA
710.39(3), .51(6), MSA 27.3178(555.39)[3], (555.51)[6]. Under the code,
parental rights may voluntarily be terminated through a release of parental
rights, MCLA 710.28, .29, MSA 27.3178(555.28), (555.29), or by a putative father's nonassertion of his rights or interest in a child, MCLA
710.37, MSA 27.3178(555.37). Parental rights of a putative father may
involuntarily be terminated under the code. MCLA 710.37, .39, MSA
27 .3178(555.37), (555.39). A noncustodial parent's.rights may also involuntarily be severed on the petition of a stepparent who wishes to adopt a
child. MCLA 710.51(6), MSA 27.3178(555.51)[6]. See §§18.27-18.32
regarding the termination of parental rights under the Adoption Code.
B.

At the Initial Dispositional Hearing
§20.23 Termination need not be a two-stage process in which the
child is made first a temporary ward of the court and subsequently a
permanent ward pursuant to MCLA 712A.19b, MSA 27.3178(598.1%). A
child may be placed in the permanent custody of the court at the initial
dispositional hearing under the circumstances specified in MCR 5.974(D).
MCLA 712A.19b(4), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[4].
There are four requirements for termination at the initial disposition:
1. The original or amended petition must request termination.
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2. The trier of fact must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the child comes under the jurisdiction of the court. MCLA 712A.2(b),
MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b].
3. On the basis of legally admissible, clear, and convincing evidence at
the trial or plea, the court finds that one or more of the petition's
allegations are true, justify terminating at the inital disposition, and
fall under the statutory grounds for termination at MCLA
712A.l9b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3].
4. On the basis of all relevant and material evidence, see MCR
5.974(F)(2), the court determines that termination is in the best interest of the child.
MCR 5.974(D).
C.

After the Child Resides in Foster Care
1. In General
§20.24 MCLA 712A.l9b, MSA 27.3178(598.19b) applies if a child
is in foster care in the temporary custody of the court and the court
subsequently finds that it is appropriate to terminate parental rights. In
such a case, there typically is a period when attempts are made to help the
family correct existing problems. During this time, the social worker may
conclude that the family cannot be reunited and that the termination of
parental rights is the appropriate action. This approach has two stages: (I)
temporary custody and (2) a supplemental petition seeking to terminate
parental rights, alleging one or more of the grounds listed in § 19b. MCR
5.974(F) governs termination proceedings under this section.
A supplemental petition to terminate parental rights must be filed no
later than 42 days after a review or permanency planning hearing. A
termination hearing must be held within 42 days after the filing of a
supplemental petition. "The court may, for good cause shown, extend the
time period for an additional 21 days." MCR 5.974(F)(l).
MCLA 712A.19b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3] outlines nine separate legal grounds for the termination of parental rights when a child
remains in foster care in the temporary custody of the juvenile court.
These are discussed individually in §§20.25-20.31.
2. Desertion
§20.25 Desertion of a child forms the first basis for terminating
parental rights. Parental rights may be terminated under MCLA
712A.l9b(3)(a), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][a] if "[t]he child has been
deserted under either of the following circumstances:" (I) the parent is
unidentifiable, has deserted the child for 28 or more days, and has not
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sought custody during that period or (2) the parent has deserted the child
for 91 or more days and has not sought custody during that period. A
parent is "unidentifiable" if the parent cannot be identified after "reasonable efforts have been made to locate and identify the parent."
In 1988, this section was amended to change· the time for abandonment from six months to 91 days. Cases decided under the old rule should
still be instructive. Intent to desert or abandon is shown by a failure to
provide support or to communicate. Minimal contact between parent and
child need not defeat this subsection as a basis for termination since the
court may declare a child deserted or abandoned if the parent or guardian
has not made "regular <md substantial efforts" to support or communicate
with the child. In re Sharpe, 68 Mich App 619, 243 NW2d 696 (1976).
Failure to provide support or to communicate for six months is presumptive evidence of an intent to abandon. In re Sterling, 162 Mich App 328,
412 NW2d 284 (1987); In re Sears, 150 Mich App 555, 389 NW2d 127
(1986). Even if a parent communicates with the child during a six-month
period, parental rights may be terminated if the parent fails to provide
support during that time. In re Andeson, 155 Mich App 615, 400 NW2d
330 (1986); see also In re Nelson, 190 Mich App 237, 475 NW2d 448
(1991); In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 469 NW2d 56 (1991); In re
Webster, 170 Mich App 100, 427 NW2d 596 (1988).

3. Physical Injury or Sexual Abuse
§20.26 The termination of parental rights due to physical or
sexual abuse is pennitted under MCLA 712A.I9b(3)(b), MSA
27.3178(598.19b)[3][b], which reads:
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury
or physical or sexual abuse under either of the following circumstances:
(i) A parent's act caused the . . . abuse and the court finds that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from injury or
abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent's home.
(ii) A parent who had the opportunity to prevent the . . . abuse
failed to do so and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if
placed in the parent's home.

Note that this language allows termination based on the injury to a sibling
of a child. It also addresses both the assailant and the parent who failed to
protect. The abuse alone is not enough, since the court must also find a
risk to harm in the foreseeable future if the child is returned.
Even before this section was amended in 1988, to explicitly recognize
failure to protect, case law dealt with a parent's duty to protect. In In re
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Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 451 NW2d 576 (1990), a mother's rights were

terminated because she gave the abusive father access to the children.
Parental rights may be terminated for neglect if a parent permits an
environment to exist in which children will likely be abused, even though
that parent has not personally abused the child. In re Parshall, 159 Mich
App 683, 406 NW2d 913 (1987). The inability of a parent to protect
children from sexual assault and the failure to prevent further contact with
the assailant are grounds for termination. In re Sprite, 155 Mich App 531,
400 NW2d 320 (1986); In re Rinesmith, 144 Mich App 475, 376 NW2d
139 (1985).

4. No Progress by Parents
§20.27 MCLA 712A.19b(3)(c), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][c] allows the termination of parental rights if, after 182 days have elapsed
since the initial dispositional order, "[t]he conditions that led to the
adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that
the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the
age of the child" or the parents have failed to rectify "other conditions"
that place the child under the jurisdiction of the court. This section relates
to the progress that the court should be reviewing every 91 days at review
hearings. If progress has been poor and the outlook for change is poor, the
termination of parental rights may be pursued under this section. In In re
Dahms, 187 Mich App 644,468 NW2d 315 (1991), a mother's rights were
terminated pursuant to this section due to her need for two or three more
years of therapy before she could resume parenting. See also In re Mcintyre, 192 Mich App 47, 480 NW2d 293 (1991) (respondent's continued
incarceration indicated that conditions would not change).
An order terminating parental rights was reversed when the court felt
the parents had not been given adequate services and opportunities to
improve. In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 472 NW2d 38 (1991). A
parent's failure to comply fully with a DSS treatment plan does not
establish neglect without clear and convincing evidence that the treatment
plan was necessary to improve the parent's allegedly neglectful behavior.
In re Mason, 140 Mich App 734, 364 NW2d 301 (1985); In re Moore, 134
Mich App 586, 351 NW2d 615 (1984).
As to the parents' duty to produce evidence of their efforts to rectify
the conditions, the court in In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 388, 210
NW2d 482 (1973), held that it was appropriate to place the burden of
going forward (but not the burden of proof) on the parents, which "merely
requires the parents to give any indication whatsoever that the family
situation has improved." See also In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 445 NW2d
161 (1989). Both cases were decided under the former statutory language.
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Also under the former language of this section, evidence justifying a
finding that the parents would not reestablish a proper home for their
child within the next 12 months was discussed in In re Pasco, 150 Mich
App 816, 389 NW2d 188 (1986), and In re Ovalle, 140 Mich App 79, 363
NW2d 731 (1985).

5. Failure of a Guardianship
§20.28 MCLA 712A.19b(3)(d)-(f), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][d]-[f]
are products of a 1990 amendment of the juvenile code and provide a basis
for the termination of parental rights in cases involving guardianships.
These three bases for the termination of parental rights correspond to the
three bases for taking jurisdiction in cases involving guardianships. MCLA
712A.2(b)(3)-(5), MSA 27.3178(598.2)[b][3)-[5]. Guardianships over minors are granted under MCLA 700.424a, .424b, and .424c, MSA
27.5424(1), (2), and (3). Establishment of a "limited guardianship placement plan" is required by 1990 amendments whenever a parent voluntarily
turned over guardianship of a child to a third person. MCLA 700.424a,
MSA 27.5424(1). The plan sets out what is expected from the parent before
the child will be returned to the parent's custody. Termination of parental
rights under MCLA 712A.19b(3)(d), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][d] may be
granted when a parent "has substantially failed, without good cause, to
comply with a limited guardianship placement plan" and the court finds
that the noncompliance has disrupted the parent-child relationship. Termination may also be granted when a parent fails to comply with a "courtstructured plan" developed for involuntary guardianships. MCLA
712A.19b(3)(e), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][e]. Finally, the court may terminate parental rights when any parent whose child has a guardian both
fails to support and fails to stay in contact with his or her child. MCLA
712A.19b(3)(f), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][f].
6. No Proper Care or Custody
§20.29 What seems to be an all-encompassing basis for termination
appears in MCLA 712A.19b(3)(g), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][g]: "The
parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for
the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the age of the child." This 1988 amendment clarified a dispute over
whether a parent's neglect must be culpable to terminate by adding the
phrase "without regard to intent." See In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 444
NW2d 789 (1989) (culpable neglect is not required to take jurisdiction or
to terminate parental rights).
In Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 114, 92 NW2d 604 (1958), the
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Michigan Supreme Court set a standard for terminating parental rights
based on neglect: "[W]e hold that, while evidence of temporary neglect
may suffice for entry of an order taking temporary custody, the entry of an
order for permanent custody due to neglect must be based upon testimony
of such a nature as to establish or seriously threaten neglect of the child for
the long-run future." See also In re Riffe, 147 Mich App 658, 382 NW2d
842 (1985); In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 384, 210 NW2d 482 (1973).
The trial court has broad discretion in determining what is sufficient
neglect. "The quantum of neglect necessary to justify termination of
parental rights ... is not capable of precise or exact definition." In re
Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 27, 361 NW2d 20 (1984). A parent's longterm alcohol abuse that detrimentally affects the well-being of the child
may constitute neglect sufficient to justify the termination of parental
rights. In re Dupras, 140 Mich App 171, 363 NW2d 26 (1984). But see In
re Hulbert, 186 Mich App 600, 465 NW2d 36 (1990) (diagnosis of
borderline personality disorder was insufficient to terminate parental
rights without further evidence of actual neglect).
7. Parent Imprisoned
§20.30 A parent who is imprisoned for a period that will deprive the
child of a "normal home" for more than two years may lose parental rights
under MCLA 712A.19b(3)(h), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3][h]. This section
does not apply, however, if the parent has actually provided for the child's
proper care and custody (with a relative, for instance) or will be able to
provide proper care and custody "within a reasonable time considering the
age of the child." I d. The calculation of the two years of imprisonment
begins from the date offiling the petition. In re Perry, 193 Mich App 648,
484 NW2d 768 (1992); see also In re Neal, 163 Mich App 522, 414 NW2d
916 (1987).
Imprisonment alone, without showing that the child will be deprived
of a normal home for more than two years, is not a sufficient ground for
termination. In re Kidder, 395 Mich 51, 232 NW2d 672, remanding, 59
Mich App 204, 229 NW2d 380, leave to appeal granted, 393 Mich 819, on
remand, 61 Mich App 451, 233 NW2d 495 (1975). Parents may properly
place their child in a custodial environment of their choosing without court
intervention as long as that home is fit. In re Taurus F, 415 Mich 512, 330
NW2d 33 (1982); In re Hurlbut, 154 Mich App 417, 397 NW2d 332
(1986); In re Curry, 113 Mich App 821, 318 NW2d 567 (1982).
8. Rights to Sibling Previously Terminated
§20.31 A court has grounds for tennination if "[p]arental rights to 1
or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to serious and
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chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parents have been unsuccessful." MCLA 712A.19b(3)(i), MSA
27.3178(598.19b)[3][i]. This section is likely to be used in the case of a
new child born to parents who have had their parental rights terminated to
older siblings.
D.

On the Basis of Changed Circumstances
§20.32 The court rules also authorize the termination of parental
rights in cases in which termination is not sought at the initial disposition
or under MCLA 712A.19b, MSA 27.3178(598.1%). MCR 5.974(E). The
court may act on a new petition requesting the termination of a parent's
rights to a child who is already a ward of the court on "the basis of one or
more circumstance new or different from the offense that lead the court to
take jurisdiction." !d. The new circumstances must warrant the termination of rights and must fall within the statutory grounds for termination
under MCLA 712A.19b(3), MSA 27.3178(598.19b)[3]. For example, termination on the basis of changed circumstances may be appropriate if a
child in foster care was seriously harmed by a parent during a visit.
The new circumstances must be established through clear and convincing, legally admissible evidence. Then the court may decide the best
interests of the child using any relevant and material evidence. MCR
5.974(E)(l), (2).

V. Rehearings and Appeals
A.

Rehearings
§20.33 Any party may seek a rehearing or new trial by filing a
written motion within 21 days as specified by MCR 5.992. The judge may
affirm, modify, or vacate parts or all of any decision under review. MCLA
712A.21, MSA 27.3178(598.21); MCR 5.992. The court need not hold a
hearing before ruling on such a motion. A motion for rehearing will not be
considered unless it presents a matter not previously presented to or
considered by the court that, if true, would cause the court to reconsider
the case. In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 484 NW2d 672 (1992). The court
may grant a stay of the order pending a decision on the motion. MCR
5.992. After a voluntary release of parental rights, a parent must present
more than just a "change of mind" to support the granting of a rehearing.
In re Curran, 196 Mich App 380, 493 NW2d 454 (1992).

B.

Appeals
1. In General
§20.34 All appeals from the juvenile court must be on a written
transcript of the record made in the juvenile court or a settled record
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proposed by the parties and approved by the court. MCLA 600.866(1),
MSA 27A.866[1]. Except as otherwise provided in MCLA 600.861-.867,
MSA 27A.861-.867, appeals from the juvenile court are governed by
supreme court rule. MCLA 600.866(3), MSA 27A.866[3]; see also MCR
5.993, 7.101, .103, .201 et seq. "Notice of appeal shall be given to all
interested parties as provided by supreme court rule." MCLA 600.866(2),
MSA 27A.866[2]. A stay of proceedings from an order of the juvenile
division of the juvenile court may be obtained only by application to
the appellate court. MCLA 600.867(2), MSA 27 A.867[2]; MCR
7.101(H)(2)(b). Generally, an appeal must be taken within 21 days after
the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. MCR 7.101(B)(1),
.103(B)(l), .204(A)(l).
The court must advise the respondent parent of the right to appeal and
to counsel on appeal immediately after the entry of an order terminating
parental rights. MCR 5.974(H). See form 20.7. A delayed appeal from an
order terminating parental rights must be filed within 63 days after the
entry of the order of termination or the order denying its reconsideration
or rehearing. The name of the child victim in a child protective proceeding on appeal will be deleted from published opinions and replaced with
the child's initials. MCR 5.993(0).
When timely requested, counsel will be furnished to an indigent
respondent desiring to appeal an order terminating parental rights. MCR
5.974(H). The court is also authorized to furnish transcripts at public
expense under such circumstances. ld.; see also Reist v Bay Cty Circuit
Judge, 396 Mich 326, 241 NW2d 55 (1976).
2. Appeals as of Right to the Court of Appeals
§20.35 MCLA 600.861, MSA 27A.861 states that a party to a pro-

ceeding in juvenile court may appeal as a matter of right to the court of
appeals any final order that places the child under court supervision,
removes the child from the party's home, or terminates parental rights.
See also MCR 5.993(A). There is no appeal by right to the court of
appeals if the juvenile court denies the termination of parental rights.
However, the state may seek termination again "after gathering more or
better evidence," Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 764 (1982), or proceed
with an appeal to the circuit court as described in §20.36.
3. Appeals to the Circuit Court
§20.36 Unless otherwise prohibited by statute, a person aggrieved

by an order, a sentence, or a judgment of the juvenile court, other than an
order appealable under MCLA 600.861, MSA 27 A.861, may appeal to the
circuit court in the county where the order, sentence, or judgment is
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rendered. An interlocutory appeal must be by application, not as a matter
of right. MCLA 600.863(1), MSA 27 A.863[1]; MCR 5.993(B).
Instead of appealing to the circuit court, a party may appeal by leave
directly to the court of appeals if the juvenile court certifies that "(a) the
order involves a controlling question of law in which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion, and (b) an appeal directly to the Court of
Appeals may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." MCR 5.993(A)(2).
If an appeal of right within the jurisdiction of the circuit court is filed
in the court of appeals, the court of appeals may transfer the appeal to the
circuit court. MCR 5.993(C).
C. Standard of Review
§20.37 The standard for appellate review of an order terminating
parental rights is the "clearly erroneous" standard. MCR 5.974(I); In re
Cornet, 422 Mich 274, 373 NW2d 536 (1985). A finding is "clearly
erroneous" if "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." In re Riffe, 147 Mich App 658, 671, 382 NW2d
842 (1985). For the standard applied to the decision that termination is in
the best interest of the child, see In re Mcintyre, 192 Mich App 47, 480
NW2d 293 (1991).
D.

Reviews of Referee Decisions
§20.38 Unless a party demands a trial by a judge or a jury pursuant
to MCR 5.911 and 5.912, the court may assign a referee to hear the trial
and the disposition of a child protective proceeding. MCLA 712A.10,
MSA 27.3178(598.10); MCR 5.913. At the conclusion of the dispositional
hearing, the referee must inform the child, the parents, and the respondent
of the right to file a written request to have the referee's recommended
findings and conclusions reviewed by a judge. /d. Such a request must
state the reason for review and be filed within seven days after the hearing
(form 20.8). The judge may affirm, modify, or deny the recommendation
of the referee. No hearing is required. MCR 5.991.

VI. Indian Child Welfare Act
§20.39 Child custody proceedings involving the foster care placement of or termination of parental rights to an Indian child are subject to
the specific federal procedures and standards outlined in the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 USC 1901 et seq. In re Johanson, 156 Mich App 608, 402
NW2d 13 (1986); In re Morgan, 140 Mich App 594, 364 NW2d 754
(1985). MCR 5.980 provides special rules for emergency removal, place20-37
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ment, and voluntary and involuntary termination of parental rights to
Indian children. An Indian child is defined by 25 USC 1903(4) as any
unmarried person under 18 years of age who is a member of an Indian
tribe or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and the biological child
of a member of an Indian tribe. In Johanson, the court of appeals held that
the fact that a child might have an Indian heritage does not qualify the
child under the act.
The court will be held to the provisions of the act only if it knows or
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved. Petitions in child
protective proceedings must state, if known, the child's membership or
eligibility for membership in an American Indian tribe or band. MCR
5.96l(B).
In general, notice provisions in such cases vary with state law, and
the burden of proof is higher than in proceedings involving non-Indian
children. For example, parental rights may not be terminated unless supported by evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt," which must include the
testimony of "qualified expert witnesses" that continued custody of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian "is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child." 25 USC 1912(f). Such expert
witnesses must have expertise '"beyond the normal social worker qualifications."' Morgan, 140 Mich App at 603 n3; see also In re Kreft, 148
Mich App 682, 384 NW2d 843 (1986).
In addition, the petitioner must show beyond a reasonable doubt that
"active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitation programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family" but
that the efforts were unsuccessful. Morgan, 140 Mich App at 603-604
(citing 25 USC 1912(d)-(f)).
Federal law allows "any Indian child," "any parent or Indian custodian," and "the Indian child's tribe" to petition any court of competent
jurisdiction to invalidate the foster care placement of or termination of
parental rights to an Indian child under state law on showing that the
action violated certain provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Law. 25
USC 1914; see also Morgan.
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